conversation. J. Michael Stebbins' work on Lonergan's understanding of grace before 1950 was of immeasurable help in this endeavor, but despite its value, the work dismisses Rahner's supernatural existential in a rather cursory manner without the in-depth comparison being attempted here. 7 Our examination will begin by moving through Lonergan's understanding of the nature/grace relationship. First, we will examine his early position in two parts. Initially, we will see the basic position as presented in De ente supernaturali; then, we will examine another early treatise of Lonergan's that shows his understanding of how his position would manifest in the concrete. Second, we will briefly present Rahner's notion of the supernatural existential, relying principally on four points he outlined in his article, "Concerning the Relationship between Nature and Grace." Finally, we will compare more directly the two thinkers' positions, revealing both a similarity and a significant difference.
LONERGAN'S CHRISTIAN UNIVERSE
Lonergan came to his early understanding of grace as he sought to understand St.
Thomas' notion of the Christian universe, 8 and in doing so, he worked within the framework of scholastic terminology. Still, he was critical of much of post-Reformation theology's response to the nature/grace problem, and he used a fresh interpretation of In contrast, Lonergan describes his alternative as an existentialist position. 15 He reverses the foregoing essentialist presuppositions; rather than world order being derivative and finite natures being primary, world order is primary and finite natures are derivative. The universe is not structured in a series of static strata, but in a series of levels that are dynamically oriented in an "upward" fashion. Thus, finite natures are subordinate to world-order, and within world-order, lower natures are subordinate to higher natures. 16 This allows him to use both 'supernatural' and 'obediential potency' in a different way than the essentialists he critiques.
His use of 'supernatural' rests largely on his understanding of world order. 17 In that understanding, there are points of discontinuity in the universe resulting from the emergence of higher intelligibilities that cannot be accounted for completely in terms of lower intelligibilities. These higher intelligibilities sublate lower grades of being and orient them to higher ends. 18 Lower grades of being are therefore that out of which higher 15 Lonergan, "Natural Desire," 86. See also Bernard J. F. Lonergan, "Finality, Love, It is Lonergan's next move, however, that truly goes beyond the limitations of post-Reformation thought. He proposes that within a universe conceived of as a series of levels with the lower being for the sake of the higher, the higher somehow must be the end of the lower. Therefore, one has in the lower levels a finality oriented toward and proportionate to, not those lower levels, but a higher level. Lonergan terms this a 'vertical finality.'
21
Most scholastics readily admit two kinds of finality. 22 The first is absolute finality, which is the orientation of all things to God as the one self-sufficient good; the second is horizontal finality, which arises out of the restrictions placed on a thing's tendency toward the absolute end by its own essence. But Lonergan observes that within world-order there is a third kind of finality constituted by "a vertical dynamism and tendency, an upthrust from lower to higher levels of appetition and process." 23 This vertical finality resides in a concrete plurality and develops within the realm of statistical law, such that it is "not of the abstract per se but of the concrete per accidens."
24
This reference to the concrete is precisely why vertical finality is a notion that has developed later than absolute and horizontal finality. While absolute and horizontal finality are much more readily seen through metaphysics alone, it is only with the advent of modern science that vertical finality is easily seen. It has become clear that "just as the real object tends to God as real motive and real term, just as the essence of the real object 21 Stebbins, "Bernard Lonergan's Early Theology of Grace," 349. 22 The following analysis is found in Lonergan, "Finality, Love, Marriage," 18-22. 26 In fact, the notion of vertical finality enables metaphysics to explain the development modern science detects in real, concrete things as they move from lower to higher levels of being because such finality is "the very possibility of development, of novelty, of synthesis, of higher grades of being." 27 The end of such development is more excellent than the end of horizontal finality because "from the very concept of hierarchy the higher is the more excellent." 28 Yet, although it arises out of a concrete plurality, still vertical finality does arise out of what the thing is, and so it is certainly essential, though to a lesser degree than horizontal finality. Likewise, although it is less excellent than vertical finality, still the excellence of horizontal finality is only relatively less than that of vertical finality, because all finality is a limited mode of orientation to the ultimate good that is God, and so the difference between a lower and a higher excellence is always relative. The term 'supernatural,' then, denotes that more excellent end to which something has a vertical finality. 25 Lonergan, "Finality, Love, Marriage," 21. 26 Ibid. 21-22. 27 Stebbins, "Bernard Lonergan's Early Theology of Grace," 289. 28 Lonergan, "Finality, Love, Marriage," 23.
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In the case of human beings, this means that we are destined to two formally distinct finalities -a horizontal finality found in each of our individual natures directing us toward a natural, proportionate end, and a vertical finality found in a concrete plurality of humankind directing us toward a supernatural, transcendent end. While the former is the more essential proportionate grasp of God through knowledge of being, the latter is the more excellent grasp of God in Trinity through the gift of the beatific vision.
Yet it remains to explain how it is that we are able to receive that gift, and so we are now in a position to move on to the second of our terms to consider -'obediential potency.' Lonergan outlines four types of vertical finality. 29 The first three are in the realm of the relatively supernatural; they involve the finality of finite activities or entities toward higher finite activities or entities. The fourth type of vertical finality, however, involves the absolutely supernatural. This is 'obediential potency,' and it denotes the sort of potency that enables the reception, by a finite entity, of the self-communication of the divine essence.
30
This potency is explained through Lonergan's differentiation of specific types of potencies. In his scholastic language, a 'potency' is simply "an orientation or order towards act." 31 If the orientation or order is toward the production of an act, the potency is considered to be an 'active' potency. If the orientation is toward the reception of an act, the potency is a 'passive' potency. 32 The latter can be the orientation "of first act towards 29 Ibid. 20-21.
30 DES:57. 31 Stebbins, Divine Initiative, 144.
32 Ibid. 10 receiving second act," in which case it is known as an 'accidental' passive potency, or it can be the orientation "toward the reception of first act," and then this potency is known as an 'essential' passive potency. 33 Such essential passive potency can be either a 'natural' potency, in which case it "possesses neither form nor habit but none the less can be reduced to information by a created agent," or an 'obediential' potency, "which posses neither form nor habit and cannot be moved to information by any created agent."
34
De ente supernaturali offers one further differentiation. In that treatise, Lonergan proposes that any given potency can be understood as either proximate or remote. A proximate potency is "virtually of the same proportion as the first act to which it is ordered," while a remote potency "is not of the same proportion, either formally or virtually, as the act to which it is ordered." 35 This means that a proximate potency, the potency of something virtually proportionate to the reception of the higher-level reality, receiving the formal quality of "human being" versus her receiving the formal quality of "university professor." The distinction between natural and obediential potency rests on the created or uncreated status of the agent needed to bring the potency to actuality.
Finally, the distinction between proximate and remote potency regards the ontological proximity of the potential to the actual; the closer the potency is to the actuality, the less any further concrete events must occur in order for the potency to be actualized.
Condensing this complex language, we can say that obediential potency is for Lonergan a remote potency that is an essential passive potency. In other words, our capacity for the reception of God's self-communication is a potency for the reception of first act that requires further determinations before it can be actuated. This potency, further, is a species of vertical finality because the act for which it is a potency is an act beyond the proportionate level of human activity, and finally because it is a potency that can only be actuated by an infinite agent, it is of the fourth type of vertical finality -12 obediential potency. Thus for Lonergan, obediential potency is a capacity to be constituted as what one is by an uncreated agent, given certain concrete events.
The Realization of the Obediential Potency in Social Form
In one portion of his treatise De Deo Trino, Lonergan examines the concrete manifestation of grace, which concerns us precisely insofar as it illumines the vision Lonergan had of the actuation of the obediential potency in a concrete plurality of human beings. 37 To begin the discussion, he tells us that "St. "the utmost freedom of imagination" and we can bring to mind the past, the future, or other things that are not spatially proximate to us, and we can experience the "psychic adaptation" of presence when we do so, we must admit a differentiation of two types of presence in human beings -one having to do with spatial proximity and the other having to do with the freedom of humans intentionally to imitate spatial proximity. 41 Fourth, human beings are persons because "they have an intellectual nature and operate in accordance with it," and in terms of the operations proper to that intellectual nature (and thus to human personhood) "that which is known is in the knower with an intentional
existence, and what is loved is joined and united to the lover" in the same manner; this "in" is an instance of presence (it can result in "psychic adaptation") and the presence in these two operations (knowing and loving) "can be called personal presence" because these operations are proper to persons. 42 Finally, because we only truly know a person through a succession of many such presence-bearing acts, and in performing such a succession of acts we develop a habit, then "it is a habit that provides the foundation of that knowledge by which a person who is truly known is in the knower," 43 and the same is true of love. The interrelation of these elements, then, dictates that the knowledge and love with which we are concerned cannot but be deeply involved with community.
This analysis, however, is as it were from the human "side." Lonergan therefore moves on to examine the matter beginning with God. First, "God is in himself as the known in the knower and the beloved in the lover." 46 This is because the word of God, being a mental word, is formally the same as that which is known, in this case Godself.
And because in God to be is to understand, God's formal reality is God's material reality; therefore, it is God that is in God in the way a known is in the knower, and the word of toward a more substantial indwelling, one that is necessarily an indwelling and interrelationship of community.
In light of the foregoing, Lonergan can make his major proposal:
[T]he state or situation of grace refers to many distinct subjects together.
Thus to constitute the state of grace there are required (1) allowed Lonergan not only to reply to the discussion, but to go beyond it, transcend its framework, and establish a more nuanced and differentiated position.
By utilizing a notion of vertical finality to articulate obediential potency, Lonergan reworked the notions of finality and exigence that were operative in the ongoing debate. He could then posit a natural desire for a supernatural end without threatening the gratuity of that end. Further, because that natural desire involved a vertical finality, it was consequently in community that Lonergan envisioned the fulfillment of that natural desire occurring.
RAHNER'S SUPERNATURAL EXISTENTIAL
Rahner's theory of the supernatural existential tends to hold currency today on this issue; most theologians hold to an understanding of this problematic and its solution that is essentially grounded in Rahner's position, whether or not they are explicitly aware of that fact. For any other understanding of the nature/grace question to bear fruit in the discourse of the larger theological community, it must deal with Rahner's theory.
Because of the broader acceptance and knowledge of Rahner's position, we need not spend quite so much time on it as we did on Lonergan's understanding of the issue. I present here a brief account of Rahner's notion of the supernatural existential as summarized in four points he provided in his brief article, "Concerning the Relationship between Nature and Grace," followed by my own summary clarification of Rahner's theory.
First, human beings ought to have the capacity to receive the love that God is.
There must be a real, always-present potency in human beings for the reception of the divine Self; this is "the central and abiding existential of man as he really is." 60 Second, the reception of this divine Self must be the reception of a gift; therefore the capacity of the human being for the reception of the love that God is must be due not to our humanbeing-ness (nature), but to the gift of God. Our "abiding existential," then, must be supernatural. 61 Third, it is through the reception of this love in the Holy Spirit and through the gospel that we are able to determine just what it is in us that is of us and what it is that is of this "supernatural existential." That which is of us is just that which is left over after the supernatural existential is subtracted. This "'nature' in the theological sense" is that which is distinguished from the supernatural existential. 62 Fourth, nature must of itself and as human nature be open to the supernatural existential. There must be more than mere non-repugnance; there must be a real yet conditioned ordering toward the supernatural existential. This ordering can be identified as the dynamism of the human spirit, but one must be careful not to identify this dynamism as it is ordered to the supernatural existential with the dynamism experienced in our quiddity because the supernatural existential is an ever-present aspect of our quiddity as we experience it.
63
There are two fundamental points to be grasped concerning the supernatural existential. First, it is not of our nature. This is the 'supernatural' element of the term.
Whatever the supernatural existential is, it is not a result of human nature as such; it must be a gift of God. Second, it pertains not to our essence, not to our human nature as such, 60 Rahner, "Concerning the Relationship," 311. 61 Ibid. 312-313. 62 Ibid. 313-315. 63 Ibid. 315-316.
and its distinction as natural or obediential is only extrinsic. 'Natural' in this distinction refers only to the relation between the proportion of the actuating agent and that of the nature with the potency, not to the fact that the potency is of human nature, as if it were to be distinguished from obediential potency in the sense that the latter is not of human nature. Insofar as the distinction between the two potencies is extrinsic, they are both of human nature; insofar as the difference between them is of the per se, they are two really distinct potencies, one of which is ordered to a proportionate end, the other of which is ordered to a transcendent end, one of which is actuated by a finite agent, the other of which is actuated by an infinite agent. 74 This way of conceiving the solution to the issue maintains a useful distinction. First, this is precisely why the condemnation of Humani Generis does not apply to Lonergan's position: God could have created a world order without grace in which the obediential potency is not actuated, thus creating us just as we are but without concretely destining us for the beatific vision. Second, the proportionality of natural fulfillment to our natural desire is precisely why Lonergan's position is not subject to the Rahnerian critique that natural fulfillment could be made into "a half unhappiness." 75 A natural fulfillment, precisely because it is a real fulfillment of what is required, would thus not be any sort of half unfulfillment. 76 We have only one material end -God as God 26 really and completely is. But that end is reached in two formally distinct ways, both of which are fulfillments of our one natural desire, the one act proportionate and more essential, the other act disproportionate and more excellent.
CONCLUSION
It is precisely Lonergan's emphasis on the priority of world-order and the consequent importance of the concrete for his thought that allows his position on the nature-grace question to be such a complete response to the issue. Quite simply, it is not in being less existential that Lonergan's solution finds its way to affirming a natural desire for God; rather, it is in being more existential. Vertical finality resides in a concrete plurality and is of the per accidens. It belongs to matter-of-fact existential reality, but with his emphasis on the priority of world-order, Lonergan makes an allowance for the ultimately intelligible nature of the existential, and thus for him the existential does have an ontological import. Therefore, in the case of humankind's potency for the absolutely supernatural, it not only includes, but even arises from, this existential reality, and thus the actuation of that potency is a function of the concrete interaction of elements that is history. There is a relation between Rahner's emphasis on concrete quiddity and history and the position of Lonergan as outlined above insofar as, for the latter, history is the realm within which the "further determinations" of the potency occur, and so the theological study of history is, part, a study of the accrual of the "further determinations" necessary for the actuation of the potency. 
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The similarities between the position of Rahner and that of Lonergan are striking, and they have at their core a likeness resulting from the existential emphasis of each of these thinkers. Fundamentally, although Rahner's insights on the topic ran deep and he did seek to move in the direction of an existential answer to the question, as a matter of fact he was unable to overcome completely the framework that so dominated the postReformation system of the duplex ordo, and that limitation prevented him from fully overcoming the essentialist, horizontally-fixated notion of natures. He was thus prevented from being able to make the statement that Lonergan was able to make: Human beings have a natural desire for a supernatural end, God as God is in Godself.
